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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, May 2021 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Essays on the Econometric Analysis of Welfare and Preferences*
Dissertation Committee: Hiroaki Kaido, Iván Fernández-Val, Ching-to Albert Ma and Jean-Jacques Forneron

B., Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan, 2014

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Econometrics, Applied Microeconomics

WORKING PAPERS

“Identification and Inference for Welfare Gains without Unconfoundedness,” September 2020, Job Market Paper
“Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive Effects on Altruism,” (with Ching-to Albert Ma and Daniel Wiesen), June 2020, submitted

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Guaranteed Welfare Maximization for Treatment Choice”

PRESENTATIONS

The European Economic Association Annual Congress, August 2020
The Econometric Society/Bocconi University World Congress, August 2020
BU-BC Joint Workshop in Econometrics, Boston, MA, November 2019

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Research Grant, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 2017
Japanese Government Scholarship for Undergraduate Studies, 2009-2014
Academic Achievement Award, Hitotsubashi University, 2013

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Hiroaki Kaido, Boston University, Fall 2017-Present
Research Assistant for Pierre Perron, Boston University, Summer 2019

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Boston University, Summer 2018
Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Boston University, Fall 2015-Spring 2017
Teaching Assistant, Advanced Microeconomics (M.A. level), Hitotsubashi University, Spring 2014

LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Japanese (fluent), Mongolian (native), French (beginner)

COMPUTER SKILLS: MATLAB, Python, R, Stata

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: Mongolia/F1

REFERENCES

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Identification and Inference for Welfare Gains without Unconfoundedness (Job Market Paper)

This paper studies identification and inference of the welfare gain that results from switching from one policy (such as the status quo policy) to another policy. The welfare gain is not point identified in general when data are obtained from an observational study or a randomized experiment with imperfect compliance. I characterize the sharp identified region of the welfare gain and obtain bounds under various assumptions on the unobservables with and without instrumental variables. Estimation and inference of the lower and upper bounds are conducted using orthogonalized moment conditions to deal with the presence of infinite-dimensional nuisance parameters. I illustrate the analysis by considering hypothetical policies of assigning individuals to job training programs using experimental data from the National Job Training Partnership Act Study. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to assess the finite sample performance of the estimators.

Changing Preferences: An Experiment and Estimation of Market-Incentive Effects on Altruism (with Ching-to Albert Ma and Daniel Wiesen)

This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a laboratory experiment in a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and quadropoly. Prices, costs, and patient benefits are experimental incentive parameters. In monopoly, subjects choose quality to tradeoff between profits and altruistic patient benefits. In duopoly and quadropoly, we model subjects playing a simultaneous-move game. Each subject is uncertain about an opponent's altruism, and competes for patients by choosing qualities. Bayes-Nash equilibria describe subjects' quality decisions as functions of altruism. Using a nonparametric method, we estimate the population altruism distributions from Bayes-Nash equilibrium qualities in different markets and incentive configurations. Markets tend to reduce altruism, although duopoly and quadropoly equilibrium qualities are much higher than those in monopoly. Although markets crowd out altruism, the disciplinary powers of market competition are stronger. Counterfactuals confirm markets change preferences.